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Abstract 
We estimate the relationship between psychological attributes of U.S. Army recruits soon after 
enlistment and their propensity to leave service. We find that those with the worst psychological 
health are more likely to terminate employment, and we show how identifying psychologically 
unfit candidates prior to their employment can reduce the likelihood of future turnover and 
associated personnel costs.  These findings have broad application to other stressful occupations 
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Psychological health is vital for many high-stress occupations, such as police officers, 
firefighters, emergency responders, and military service-members.  Psychologically un-fit 
employees may be more likely to quit, which burdens employers with the costly task of 
recruiting and training replacements.  In this paper, we explore the feasibility of using a 
psychological assessment to identify and screen out prospective employees with poor 
psychological health. 
The population we study is new recruits to the U.S. Army.  Recruits sign multi-year 
employment contracts that can only be broken by the employer (the military).  Consistently, one 
quarter of the approximately 70,000 new recruits per year are found to be unfit for military 
service at some time during their contracted term and are discharged.  Such a discharge - defined 
as attrition - is costly because a replacement must be recruited and trained; estimates of the 
average cost per attrite are upwards of $27,000 (Enns 2012).  Attrition can occur for a variety of 
reasons, from discipline problems, to use of illicit substances, to poor mental or physical health, 
and the Army actively pursues policies to reduce attrition.  Past studies have shown that attrition 
is correlated with various pre-employment factors such as demographics and physical-health 
problems (e.g. obesity or prior injuries), and the Army indeed screens recruits on these 
dimensions (Knapik et al. 2004). Yet, despite pressure from the federal government to further 
reduce attrition costs (GAO 1997), we have no evidence to date whether psychological-health 
measures can predict soldiers’ likelihood of attrition, and thus be used as a screening instrument. 
This shortcoming in part stems from the fact that psychological health measures of new 
recruits have only recently become available.  In 2009, the Army began administering the Global 
Assessment Tool (GAT) to all new soldiers. The GAT is an online, self-administered 
questionnaire that captures 14 attributes of psychological health and resilience deemed important 
for military life.  Currently, the GAT is used only for self-awareness purposes and not shared 
with leadership. All new recruits are required to complete the GAT within the first few weeks of 
their initial training and then on an annual basis. 
We find that psychological attributes as captured by the GAT are significantly and 
meaningfully correlated with a soldier’s future propensity to attrite.  Knowing how well these 
psychological attributes predict first-term attrition can allow the Army to identify a workforce 
that is a better fit for its unique environment, and it can potentially reduce personnel costs in an 
era of increasing fiscal austerity. To our knowledge, this methodology has not been widely 
applied in other high-stress occupations, and we show it has the potential to significantly 
improve labor market outcomes. 
 
2. Data and Sample 
2.1 Data  
We use three sources of data provided by the U.S. Army: individuals’ item-level responses to 
their first GAT test; a database identifying when and why a soldier left employment; and a 
master personnel database containing demographic characteristics.  
 
Psychological Attributes 
The 14 GAT attributes are: depression, catastrophizing, positive affect, adaptability, coping 
ability, optimism, character, family satisfaction, family support, engagement in the workplace, 
friendship, loneliness, organizational trust, and spiritual fitness.  For full details of the GAT 
questionnaire see Lester et al. (2011). 
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Theoretically, all of these attributes can influence soldier attrition.  They reflect not only in-
situ psychological health (e.g., depression, affect), but also how a person might respond to 
stressors endemic to military life (e.g., optimism, catastrophizing). The more contextual and 
philosophical attributes (e.g., positive affect, spirituality) can reflect how soldiers respond to trust 
in leadership, and violations of trust can precipitate attrition. Lastly, resilience can stem from a 
support network, and a lack of friendship (or loneliness) or family support for service in the 
Army could again precipitate attrition in response to adverse events.  
The 105 individual GAT questions are collected as either binary responses or on a five-or 
10-point scale.  We standardize individual questions to be within a scale of one to five and define 
the GAT score for each attribute as the average of the individual item responses. We find similar 
results using different aggregations of the GAT questions (available upon request). For all 
attributes except two, a higher scale reflects more positive psychological attributes; the two other 
attributes—depression and catastrophizing— are reverse coded for consistency.  
 
Attrition 
The length of a first-term contract for most soldiers is usually three years, but is sometimes four 
years for certain specific occupations. As available data does not identify term length, we follow 
the literature (e.g., Golding et al. 2001) and define attrition as leaving the Army for any reason 
except for education prior to their first 36 months of service. In unreported results, we find that 
the vast majority of attrition occurs with the first year of employment, which suggests that little 
information is lost by using a three-year attrition window. 
 
2.2 Sample 
Our sample includes 17,226 enlisted soldiers without prior military service who took GAT 
within four weeks of starting basic training and whose initial service date was in fiscal year 
2010. Before October 1, 2009, the GAT questionnaire was not standardized; for those entering 
the Army after October 1, 2010, we do not have sufficient time to observe 36-month attrition.  
Table 1 shows that 28% of the sample attrited. The majority of the sample is male, white, single, 
and has no college education. The average age is 21 years, and only 24% were involved in a 
combat arms occupation.  Attriters more often are female, younger, and single, have a lower 
Armed Services Qualifying Test (AFQT) score (an ability test taken by potential recruits), and 




We first study each GAT attribute independently by comparing the distribution of scores for 
attriters and non-attriters and presenting attrition rates amongst soldiers in various percentile 
groups of the study population’s GAT distribution. 
As employers will likely be concerned with identifying those with the lowest 
psychological health, we next concentrate on differences between those with the lowest GAT 
scores and the remainder of the sample.  For brevity, we only present results comparing soldiers 
in the bottom 5 percentiles to those in the top 95 percentiles of the distribution for each attribute. 
Specifically, we estimate logistic models predicting the likelihood of attrition as a function of 
being in the lowest 5 percentiles of each attribute, and control for the covariates presented in 
Table 1.  In unreported analysis, we reach similar conclusions when choosing any other cut-off 





Figure 1 shows kernel densities of GAT scores by attrition status. The distributions of all GAT 
scores are shifted to the left amongst attriters compared to non-attriters (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests strongly reject the equality of these distributions for all attributes). The magnitude of 
differences in GAT scores between attriters and non-attriters is largest for depression, positive 
affect, and adaptability, and smallest for family satisfaction and spirituality.  
Figure 2 shows one useful way to focus on soldiers with the lowest GAT scores: bar 
charts of attrition rates within various percentiles of the distribution of GAT scores. For each 
attribute, the attrition rate is higher in the lowest 5 percentiles compared to the 6th to 25th 
percentiles, and for most attributes, this difference is the largest amongst the percentile groups 
shown. 
 We next allow the GAT attributes to jointly predict attrition in a logistic model. Column 
1 of Table 2 shows that the largest attrition differences are present for two attributes: depression 
and adaptability. Conditional on other GAT attributes, those in the bottom 5 percent of the 
distribution for the depression (the most depressive) are 1.54 times more likely to attrite than 
those in the top 95 percent of the distribution. Those in the bottom 5 percent for positive affect, 
optimism, engagement, organizational trust, and family support are also more likely to attrite. 
Interestingly, low spirituality scores are associated with lower attrition during the first term, 
which may reflect that spiritual individuals discover they have moral conflicts with the realities 
of military service.  
Controlling for individual-level covariates in column 2 changes the point estimates on 
GAT variables very little.  This suggests that the variation in psychological health is independent 
of observable demographics, and that the GAT adds meaningfully to the Army’s ability to 
predict future attrition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have demonstrated that a set of self-reported questions can predict employee retention.  Our 
results have important implications for recruiting strategies in the Army, and other large 
organizations with stressful work environments. However, if the Army is to consider using 
psychometric screening, it must be sure the policy’s benefits outweigh its costs. 
On one hand, screening out soldiers with low GAT scores will reduce training and personnel 
costs, as fewer soldiers would need to be hired. On the other hand, screening based on the GAT 
alone is a blunt policy instrument: many low-GAT recruits (who would be screened out in this 
policy) would have satisfactorily completed their contractual term, forcing the Army to recruit 
and train more soldiers. 
To illustrate, suppose the Army screens out recruits who scored in the bottom 5 percentiles of 
the depression attribute before they enter initial training.1  Compared to the status quo, yearly 
recruiting expenditures would increase by $15.8 million, but $5.4 million would be saved on 
enlistment-bonuses and $16.7 million saved in training/personnel costs. Thus, this hypothetical 
policy would save $6.3 million per year in personnel cost alone, and savings could be higher if  
the Army chose the screening cut-off optimally. 2  
                                                
1 See the Online Appendix for the details of these calculations. 
2 There are likely other benefits and costs of screening; for example, screening could lower medical expenditures, or 
reduce the incidence of catastrophic, psychologically-induced events such as the recent shootings at Fort Hood, 
Texas.    
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We advocate future research on the relationship between psychological screening and 
worker retention (or other worker performance measures) across a range of settings with 
different work stress levels in order to further our understanding of the role and effectiveness of 
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Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.)
(4)
A+rited0within0the0first0360months 0.28 (0.003)
Male 0.79 (0.003) 0.82 (0.004) 0.71 (0.006) 0.000
Age0(SE) 21.42 (0.033) 21.61 (0.004) 20.93 (0.006) 0.000
Race/ethnicity
White 0.63 (0.003) 0.63 (0.004) 0.64 (0.007) 0.206
Black 0.20 (0.003) 0.19 (0.004) 0.21 (0.006) 0.011
Hispanic 0.12 (0.002) 0.12 (0.003) 0.10 (0.005) 0.000
Asian 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.003) 0.734
Other0race 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.681
Highest0educaNonal0a+ainment
High0school 0.88 (0.002) 0.86 (0.003) 0.92 (0.005) 0.000
College 0.11 (0.002) 0.13 (0.003) 0.08 (0.005) 0.000
Graduate0school 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.044
Marital0Status
Single 0.80 (0.003) 0.79 (0.004) 0.82 (0.006) 0.000
Married 0.19 (0.003) 0.20 (0.004) 0.17 (0.006) 0.000
Divorced 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.002) 0.021
AFQT0percenNle0(SE) 61.63 (0.149) 62.51 (0.175) 58.37 (0.282) 0.000
OccupaNon
Combat0arms 0.24 (0.003) 0.24 (0.004) 0.24 (0.006) 0.417
Combat0support 0.18 (0.003) 0.18 (0.003) 0.17 (0.006) 0.269
Combat0service0support 0.35 (0.004) 0.33 (0.004) 0.40 (0.007) 0.000
AviaNon 0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0.05 (0.003) 0.002
Other0occupaNon 0.18 (0.003) 0.19 (0.003) 0.15 (0.005) 0.000












Mean (s.e) Mean (s.e)
Lowest-5th-percen3le-of-GAT-category
Depression-(reverse-coding) 1.667*** (0.125) 1.543*** (0.118)
Catastrophizing-(reverse-coding) 1.054 (0.081) 0.999 (0.078)
Posi3ve-affect 1.336*** (0.110) 1.335*** (0.112)
Adaptability 1.591*** (0.132) 1.521*** (0.128)
Coping-ability 1.074 (0.087) 1.044 (0.086)
Op3mism 1.352*** (0.093) 1.357*** (0.095)
Posi3ve-character-ac3ons 1.081 (0.089) 1.094 (0.091)
Engagement-with-job 1.247*** (0.092) 1.234*** (0.092)
Inclusion 1.147** (0.077) 1.135* (0.077)
Organiza3onal-trust 1.264*** (0.097) 1.234*** (0.097)
Friendship 0.959 (0.084) 0.981 (0.087)
Family-sa3sfac3on 1.084 (0.066) 1.035 (0.064)
Family-support 1.305*** (0.101) 1.318*** (0.104)






























Figure 1. The distribution of GAT scores by GAT attributes and attrition status. 
 
Legend:  Blue Solid Line = Did not attrite 
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Online Appendix. Summary of the Cost Calculation Behind the Illustrative Example 
 
Attrition may be costly to the Army because when a soldier leaves the service, the Army must 
recruit and train a replacement. As noted by May and Hughes (1986) however, the attrition cost 
to the military is not the full cost of training and replacing a recruit; rather, it is these costs less 
the benefit that the military has received from having the soldier in service up to the point of 
attrition. As such, the cost of attrition varies over the first term, increasing during the training 
process and then decreasing as the soldier provides more productive services to the Army. 
We evaluate a scenario that would reduce attrition, yet would do so at the cost of needing 
to replace non-attriting soldiers. Thus, we need to consider the costs and benefits (for personnel 
costs) of all aspects of this hypothetical policy. 
There would be three types of costs/benefits associated with a policy that screened out the 
recruits: (1) Higher recruiting costs, as new soldiers would need to be recruited to replace the 
ones that were recruited but screened out; (2) Lower costs due to fewer accessions and 
enlistment bonuses needed due to attrition being lower for the soldiers not screened out; and (3) 
Lower training and personnel cost—with fewer accessions, there are fewer soldiers to train to 
meet manpower goals. 
 Our method is predicated on the notion that the cost of attrition varies, depending on 
when in the first term the attrition occurs. Cost data for FY2011 were provided to us through 
personal communications with Army officials, and we convert all amounts to FY2010 dollars. 
Appendix Table 1, below, summarizes the cost components used in the illustration. 
The first step in our simulation is to set a manpower goal for the Army. This will 
determine how the number of accessions and recruits would need to change in response to the 
new policy of screening out those in the bottom 5th percentile of the depression scores. We chose 
to set the goal as obtaining the same number of “first-term productive soldier-months,” defined 
as the number of soldier-months served after initial training through 3.5 years (about the average 
first-term length).  
With this manpower goal, we calculate the number of recruits that would be needed to 
achieve that goal, taking into account that a percentage would be disqualified for low scores in 
the depression category.  
Following are the steps for the simulation: 
1. Calculate the continuation rates (which is opposite of attrition) for soldiers from the 
bottom 5% and top 95% of GAT depression scores. We assume that any replacement 
recruits (for those screened out) would have the same attrition/continuation profile as the 
top 95% GAT depression scorers. Beyond 36 months, we assume that one percent of 
remaining soldiers attrite each month. 
2. Determine the number of accessions that gives the same number of soldier-months after 
initial training (69,041). 
3. Calculate how many recruits are needed to reach that number of accessions (72,675) 
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using the assumption that 5% of the all recruits would be screened out.3 
4. Calculate the increase in recruiting costs by multiplying the increase in the number of 
recruits needed to obtain 70,000 accessions (2,675) by the average recruiting costs of 
$5,924. This uses the conservative assumption that the recruiting costs would be the same 
for those screened out as those processed through to the enlistment. 
5. Calculate the cost savings in enlistment bonuses by multiplying the reduction in the 
number of accessions needed (959) by the average enlistment bonus of $5,641.   
6. Use the continuation rates to determine the number of soldiers in service in each month 
of the first term and the number of soldier-months in various stages of the first term 
(Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, and the rest of the term).   
7. Calculate the in-service difference in personnel costs, for each month, by multiplying the 
difference in the number of soldiers between the new policy and status quo by the 
marginal cost of a soldier in a given month and summing across months. The model is set 
up so that the number of soldier-months for the post-training part of the first term is the 
same in the status quo and under the new policy. 
 
  
Appendix Table 1: The Cost Components of Recruiting and Training 
 
	  	   Cost	  element	  to	  the	  Army	  
Recruiting	   $4,562	  
Recruiting	  bonuses	   $5,641	  
Processing	  (MEPCOM)	   $1,362	  
Basic	  Combat	  Training	   $11,836	  
Advanced	  Individual	  Training	   $20,492	  
Notes:	  
Recruiting	  costs	  and	  recruiting	  bonuses	  are	  marginal	  costs.	  MEPCOM	  costs	  are	  average	  
total	  costs	  including	  all	  fixed	  and	  variable	  costs.	  Basic	  Combat	  Training	  and	  Advanced	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Marine Corps,” Center for Naval Analysis. CRM 86-168. 
 
                                                
3 Since 5% of new recruits would be low in the depression category and thus screened out. The Army would replace 
this 5% with more recruits, of whom 5% would be expected to be low-R/PH and again screened out. This process 
would repeat itself; ultimately, the Army would need 5.26% (=1/(1-.05) – 1) new accessions. 
